State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court by Abrahamson, Shirley S.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2004
State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism,
and the Rehnquist Court
Shirley S. Abrahamson
Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court , 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 339 (2004)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/4
 339 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM, AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON1 
Dean Steinglass, faculty, students, fellow panelists, guests.  Ohio, as you all 
know, was admitted to the Union on March 1, 1803.2  It was the seventeenth state.3  
The state is celebrating this 200th anniversary with a yearlong series of activities 
honoring the state’s rich history:  bicentennial bells, historical markers, celebration 
of Ohio’s role in the birth and development of aviation and aerospace, Ohio’s Tall 
Ship Challenge, Tall Stacks on the Ohio River, and a bicentennial stamp. 
The Ohio legal system also celebrates the bicentennial.  It celebrates in quiet 
contemplation of its state constitutional history. 
The first Ohio constitution came with statehood in 1803.4  That constitution was 
then replaced by a new constitution in 1851.5  Since then, the Ohio Constitution has 
been amended 153 times, averaging nearly one amendment per year.6 
As a guest at this celebration of the bicentennial anniversary of the Ohio 
Constitution, I was inspired to learn a little bit about Ohio. 
Ohio, I discovered, was the first state carved out of the Northwest Territory.7  It 
was an early gateway to the wild, untamed western area of the United States8—a 
                                                                
1Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court.  The author wishes to thank Kevin Francis 
O’Neill, Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and Attorney Ingrid 
A. Nelson, judicial assistant to Chief Justice Abrahamson, for their work in preparing this 
speech for publication. 
2GEORGE W. KNEPPER, OHIO AND ITS PEOPLE 92-93 (3d ed. 2003); WILLIAM T. UTTER, THE 
FRONTIER STATE 1803-1825, at 31(1942); OHIO ALMANAC 14 (Roberta Rivera ed., 1977); 3 
EMILIUS O. RANDALL & DANIEL J. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO 153-54 (1912). 
3ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OHIO 66 (Frank H. Gille ed., 1982); OHIO ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 
14. 
4The convention that drafted Ohio’s first constitution completed its work on November 29, 
1802.  KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 92; 3 RANDALL & RYAN, supra note 2, at 141.  That 
constitution went into effect on February 19, 1803, when President Thomas Jefferson signed 
federal legislation approving it.  KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 92 
5KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 204-06; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OHIO, supra note 3, at 70; OHIO 
ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 24; EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM & FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, A 
HISTORY OF OHIO 164 (2d ed. 1969). 
6See Table of Proposed Amendments to Ohio Constitution, OHIO REV. CODE ANN., OHIO 
CONST. at 587-607 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS]. 
7KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 82-93; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OHIO, supra note 3, at 86-87; OHIO 
ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 14; UTTER, supra note 2, at 3-31; 3 RANDALL & RYAN, supra note 
2, at 145-54. 
8See generally R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE OHIO FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD 
NORTHWEST, 1720-1830 (1996); OLIN DEE MORRISON, OHIO, “GATEWAY STATE” (1965); 
DAVID ELDRIDGE CROUSE, THE OHIO GATEWAY (1938). 
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reference that included Wisconsin, my home state.  Wisconsin may seem to some 
still part of the untamed west.  Earlier this month, the citizens of Wisconsin amended 
the state constitution to provide people “the right to fish, hunt, trap and take game 
subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law.”9 
A buckeye, I discovered, comes from the many buckeye trees that once covered 
the hills and plains.10  The Indians called the tree “buckeye” because the markings on 
the nut resembled the eye of a buck.11 
More on point—and of particular interest to me, a state supreme court justice—I 
discovered that the citizens of Ohio were long skeptical of the power of the Ohio 
Supreme Court.12  In 1807, just a few years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
that it had the power to determine the constitutionality of legislative enactments in 
Marbury v. Madison,13 Justice George Tod of the Ohio Supreme Court wrote that the 
Ohio Supreme Court had the power to declare an Ohio legislative act 
unconstitutional.14  He then struck down an act under the state constitution.15  As a 
result of the opinion, he faced the threat of impeachment16 and survived by just one 
vote in the Senate.17 
In 1912, judicial review was limited by an amendment to the Ohio Constitution 
that required the vote of six of the seven justices to strike down a state statute as 
unconstitutional.18  It was not until 1968 that this amendment was repealed and the 
                                                                
9WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 26.  The detailed inclusion of such special rights is a common 
feature of state constitutions.  Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is it 
Necessary?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2001). 
10SAM BENVIE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN TREES 39 (2000); THOMAS S. 
ELIAS, THE COMPLETE TREES OF NORTH AMERICA 768 (1980). 
11CLARENCE M. WEED, OUR TREES: HOW TO KNOW THEM 245 (5th ed. 1936). 
12See Christopher M. Winter, Comment, The Ohio Supreme Court Reaffirms Its Right to 
Declare Statutes Unconstitutional, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1468, 1471 (2000). 
135 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
14Rutherford v. McFaddon (1807), in ERVIN H. POLLACK, OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 71 (1952); id. at 87 (Tod, J., concurring) (“legislative acts are 
subordinate to, and must be tested by, constitutional provisions”).  See KNEPPER, supra note 2, 
at 97-98; ROSEBOOM & WEISENBURGER, supra note 5, at 73-74; UTTER, supra note 2, at 45; 3 
RANDALL & RYAN, supra note 2, at 155-57; Winter, supra note 12, at 1471; Frederick 
Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13 
U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 275 (1939). 
15POLLACK, supra note 14, at 86-87 (Tod, J., concurring) (invoking OHIO CONST. of 1802, 
art. VIII, § 7).  See KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 97-98; Winter, supra note 12, at 1471. 
16POLLACK, supra note 14, at 100; KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 98; ROSEBOOM & 
WEISENBURGER, supra note 5, at 74; UTTER, supra note 2, at 48-49; 3 RANDALL & RYAN, 
supra note 2, at 157-58; Winter, supra note 12, at 1471; Woodbridge, supra note 14, at 275-
76. 
17POLLACK, supra note 14, at 102; KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 98; UTTER, supra note 2, at 
51; Winter, supra note 12, at 1471; Woodbridge, supra note 14, at 276. 
18OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1912) (“No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the 
Supreme Court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges….”).  See OHIO 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 590; 1 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/4
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Ohio Supreme Court could once again declare state statutes unconstitutional by a 
simple majority.19 
The structure of state government and the power of each branch of government 
are, of course, important issues that are uniquely matters of state constitutional law.20 
Which brings me to the topic of this keynote address.  I consider it my task this 
evening to put the Ohio Constitution into the larger context of federal and state 
constitutionalism, and to lay the groundwork for the heavy lifting that will be done 
tomorrow when the speakers will focus on trends in Ohio constitutional 
interpretation and specific issues in Ohio state constitutionalism such as equal 
protection, separation of powers, tort reform, and education. 
Since the first state constitutions were drafted, their importance and development 
in protecting individual rights and shaping state and local government have ebbed 
and flowed as views of the U.S. Constitution and federal-state relationships have 
changed.21 
Today, I believe, we find ourselves at an interesting crossroads.  Over the past 
few decades, under the banner of new judicial federalism, many state courts have 
asserted a role for state constitutions in the protection of individual liberties and the 
resolution of legal disputes.22  This outburst of state constitutional fervor, however, 
has been met with great criticism from different camps, all believing that the 
uniformity provided by our federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court should guide state court decisions and especially state constitutional 
interpretation.23  At the same time, the very ability of state courts to decide state 
constitutional questions is being threatened. The Rehnquist Court has carved out for 
itself a greater ability to review the decisions of state courts, even on matters of state 
law.24 
I will set the stage for tomorrow’s program by discussing the ebb and flow of the 
importance and development of state constitutions through this country’s history.  I 
will then paint a picture of the present and what I see as new interesting times for 
                                                          
LAWYERS OF OHIO 155 (Carrington T. Marshall ed., 1934); Winter, supra note 12, at 1472; 
Woodbridge, supra note 14, at 278. 
19See OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, supra note 6, at 598; Winter, supra note 12, at 
1472. 
20See Hammons, supra note 9, at 1329-30. 
21See Jennifer DiGiovanni, Justice Charles M. Leibson and the Revival of State 
Constitutional Law: A Microcosm of a Movement, 86 KY. L.J. 1009, 1010-15 (1997-98); 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 726-31 (1991); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State 
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1144-48 
(1985).  
22See 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 1-1(a) (3d ed. 2000).  
23E.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 761 (1992).  See 1 FRIESEN, supra note 22, at § 1-3(d) (recounting the criticism directed 
at state constitutional independence).  
24See Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State Constitutional Law, 34 TULSA 
L.J. 67, 70-73 (1998).  
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state constitutional law.  The past thirty years have seen the reemergence of state 
constitutional law, but this reemergence may be facing an increasingly hostile 
environment.  
I. 
Federalism is a slippery word.  At the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the word 
“federalists” referred to those who favored a strong central government.25  
Thereafter, however, the word “federalism” has often been used to mean states’ 
rights.26  I suppose this shift is appropriate, as the word “federalism” in its most 
neutral and generic sense refers to the distribution of power between the national 
government and the states—a distribution of power that is ever shifting.27 
The interconnectedness of state and federal constitutional law is, of course, by 
design.  The U.S. Constitution embraced two political entities within one system:  a 
central government and the states.28  The framers of the U.S. Constitution rejected a 
purely national government, but at the same time recognized that the central 
government was to be more than a confederation of separate nation states.29  The 
central government was not to swallow up the states, and the states were not to 
undermine the national government.30  As James Madison wrote, the U.S. 
Constitution “is in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a 
composition of both.”31 
States and state constitutions predate the federal Constitution.32  The federal 
Constitution is built on the existence of states, making reference to states over fifty 
times.  On the other hand, to ensure that the laws and constitution of the central 
government would be fairly and uniformly applied, the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution included a supremacy clause.33  Article VI of the Constitution declares 
that the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are the supreme law of 
the land.34 
                                                                
25See David F. Epstein, The Case for Ratification: Federalist Constitutional Thought, in 
THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 292, 294 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis 
J. Mahoney eds., 1987) [hereinafter FRAMING AND RATIFICATION].  
26See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 408 (2003).  
27ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3 (2d ed. 2002).  
28Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S. Gutmann, New Federalism: State Constitutions and 
State Courts, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?  THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS 103, 105-
08 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987).  
29See Michael P. Zuckert, A System Without Precedent: Federalism in the American 
Constitution, in FRAMING AND RATIFICATION, supra note 25, at 132.  
30Id.  
31THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
32Leonard W. Levy, Introduction: American Constitutional History, 1776-1789, in 
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION, supra note 25, at 1, 1; Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, The Florida 
Constitution: Still Champion of Citizens’ Rights?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 87, 89 (1997).  
33Zuckert, supra note 29, at 144.  
34U.S. CONST. art. VI.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/4
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State constitutions generally serve two functions in our federal system.  To a 
large extent, they determine the structure of state government, and they protect 
individual liberties.35 
The state constitution prescribes how the powers of government are distributed 
among the branches of government and between state and local governments.36  The 
Ohio Constitution, for example, creates the typical state government structure of an 
executive branch,37 a bicameral legislature,38 and an elected judiciary.39  The Ohio 
Constitution, like other state constitutions, restrains legislative power in several 
ways, such as prohibiting special legislation40 and limiting taxing and public 
financing.41  The limiting provisions are, to a large extent, in response to deleterious 
legislative activities and the rise of economic centers of power. 
State constitutions, through a bill of rights or declaration of rights, also protect 
individual liberties, such as freedom of speech, religion, and press, and freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, against intrusion by state government, and 
sometimes against action by private persons.42 
As you all know, the federal Constitution did not originally have a bill of rights.43  
To many of the constitutional convention delegates, the guarantees of individual 
liberty in each state constitution were sufficient.  Because the central government 
was a government of limited enumerated powers, a bill of rights was considered 
unnecessary.44 
The people, however, were not persuaded by this argument during the ratification 
process.  The first session of the first Congress therefore drafted a series of 
constitutional amendments to the federal Constitution.45  Ten of these amendments 
were approved by the required number of states in 1791 and are now known as the 
Bill of Rights.46 
(Interestingly, the framers’ arguments against a bill of rights would have fallen 
on deaf ears today as well.  In celebrating the 200th anniversary of the federal 
                                                                
35Hammons, supra note 9, at 1329-31.  
36Id. at 1329-30; Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State 
Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 211 (2002).  
37OHIO CONST. art. III.  
38OHIO CONST. art. II.  
39OHIO CONST. art. IV  
40E.g., OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 1.  
41OHIO CONST. art. XII.  
42Hammons, supra note 9, at 1331-32.  See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I.  
43Murray Dry, The Case Against Ratification: Anti-Federalist Constitutional Thought, in 
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION, supra note 25, at 271, 287; Robert A. Rutland, Framing and 
Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in FRAMING AND RATIFICATION, supra note 25, at 305, 
305.  
44Epstein, supra note 25, at 299; Dry, supra note 43, at 287-88.  
45Rutland, supra note 43, at 309-15.  
46Id. at 315-16.  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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Constitution in 1987, citizens were urged to sign a copy of the original constitution.  
Many would not sign the original constitution because it supported slavery, did not 
have a bill of rights, and did not guarantee women the right to vote.  Very quickly, 
the sponsors of the celebration added all the amendments, and people very willingly 
signed the document.) 
While the citizens in 1791 were able to get a bill of rights added to the 
Constitution, the federal Bill of Rights was fairly limited in its protections for well 
over a century, because it limited only those actions of the federal government.47  
State actions were to be governed by individual state constitutions, and the federal 
government did not get involved.48 
In 1833, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, requiring compensation for taking of property, did not 
protect a person against the acts of the City of Baltimore.49 
The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments—changed the scope of the U.S. Bill of Rights and 
changed the relationship between the national and state court systems.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly limits states’ interference with civil liberties.  It 
prohibits the state from making or enforcing any law that abridges the privileges or 
immunities of U.S. citizens; that deprives any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; or that denies any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of law.50  The last section of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers 
Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation.51  
Still, from 1787 to 1925, the Bill of Rights offered individuals little or no 
protection in their relations with state and local governments.52  The state 
constitutions provided these protections.53  And during this period, the states’ records 
in preserving individual rights were uneven—varying from state to state and from 
right to right.54 
Then, in 1925, this division between state and federal constitutional law began to 
crumble.  That year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gitlow v. New York,55 and 
suggested in dictum that the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are among 
the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment against state government.56 
Many have argued that it was the failure of the states to provide better protection 
for individual rights that created a void that the U.S. Supreme Court filled.  Others 
                                                                
47CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 5-6.  
48Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 28, at 121.  
49Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
50U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
51U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  
52CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 470-79.  
53Id. at 472; Fugate, supra note 32, at 90. 
54Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 28, at 121.  
55268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
56Id. at 666.  
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have pointed out that the nationalization of individual liberties coincided with 
technological, economic, and social changes that tended toward nationalization. 
Either way, after 1925 the U.S. Supreme Court began a process of incorporating 
the enumerated guarantees of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth 
Amendment,57 with the pace accelerating in the Warren Court in the 1960s.58  
Because many of the first eight amendments deal with the criminal process, the 
incorporation doctrine involves, to a large extent, but not exclusively, a defendant’s 
criminal procedural rights.59  The Court also expanded First Amendment protections, 
barring states from requiring prayers in public schools60 and limiting the extent to 
which public officials61 and public figures62 could avail themselves of state libel 
laws. 
The incorporation doctrine gave prominence to the U.S. Constitution as a 
protection against invasions of individual liberties by either the state or national 
government.  State courts were therefore routinely applying federal law in state 
cases.  The federal Constitution was a floor, a minimum, which was in many states 
above the state constitutional ceiling.63 
Under these circumstances, the state bills of rights had little to add to their federal 
counterpart.  The state bills of rights began to lose their significance in state court 
cases.64  Soon, state courts and lawyers forgot to examine their state constitutions, 
and there was talk that revised state constitutions did not need a bill of rights in the 
post-incorporation era.65  The nationalization of individual rights through the 
Fourteenth Amendment seemed to have arrested the development of state 
constitutional law.  
II. 
In the 1970s came the resurgence of state constitutions with the birth of “new 
judicial federalism,” sometimes referred to as “new federalism.”66 
New judicial federalism refers to state courts’ examining their own constitutions 
to determine individual civil liberties.67  The emergence of this “new judicial 
                                                                
57CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 478-84.  
58Id. at 483.  
59Id.  
60Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  
61New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
62Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).  
63Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 28, at 123.  
64Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: 
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 636 (1987) (reporting that during the 
1950s and 1960s, “only ten state court decisions relied on state constitutional provisions to 
protect individual rights”).  
65Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 28, at 124.  
66See 1 FRIESEN, supra note 22, at § 1-1(a).  
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federalism” is generally attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan 
and an article he wrote for the Harvard Law Review in 1977.68  Justice Brennan 
urged state courts to look to their own state constitutions and to become a new “font 
of individual liberties.”69  Why?  Brennan, and others, saw the Burger Court as 
retreating from protecting individual rights and as using procedural devices designed 
to limit federal adjudication of claims against state action.70 
A state court’s decision to rely on its own constitutional law does not necessitate 
a particular result in a case.  Under the theory of new judicial federalism, a state 
court may interpret its state constitution in the same way that federal courts have 
interpreted an analogous federal provision.  On the other hand, a state court may, 
without violating the U.S. Constitution, interpret a state constitution as granting an 
individual more protection than the federal rights.71 
Since the 1970s, new judicial federalism has been the subject of a raging debate 
in law reviews and journals and among state court judges.  The debate centers on 
whether state court reliance on the state constitution is a sound process of decision-
making. 
The proponents of new judicial federalism argue that our federalism is based on 
the dual concepts of strong states and a strong national government.  They argue that 
states should continue to look to state law to decide state court cases in the post-
incorporation era.72 
Proponents also argue that even if there were only one correct answer to 
questions of textual interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court should not be deemed 
always to have a monopoly on the correct answer.73  Different courts might reach 
different conclusions about the meaning of the open textual provisions of a 
constitution;74 each judge should construct the best interpretation of a constitutional 
                                                          
67Id.; G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1097 (1997); Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s 
First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996).  
68William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).  
69Id. at 491.  
70Id. at 495-98.  
71See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology 
and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy 
of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).  In 
construing their own constitutions, state court judges are free to find greater protection for 
individual liberty than that found by federal judges in the analogous provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution.  City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).  This is true even where the state and 
federal constitutions have similar or identical language.  Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. at 293; 
Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81.  
72See Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become 
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065 (1997)  
73Id. at 1067; Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1155 (1993).  
74Friesen, supra note 72, at 1069; Kahn, supra note 73, at 1155. 
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doctrine of which he or she is capable.75  State courts needn’t shift with changes in 
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, urge proponents of new federalism.76 
An advantage of new judicial federalism, according to its proponents, is that a 
state can be innovative within its own borders without involving the entire nation.  
State courts have greater latitude in devising remedies that respond to local concerns.  
Indeed, state judicial review may be said to foster the values of federalism by 
allowing the nation to profit by using what succeeds in a state and avoiding what 
fails.77 
Finally, the proponents urge that when a state court’s interpretation of a state 
constitutional provision differs from the federal courts’ interpretation of a similar 
federal provision, a constructive dialogue on the issue continues among judges, 
scholars, and the people.78 
On the other side of this debate is a diverse group of critics.  Opponents of new 
judicial federalism come from many camps, and they object to state court deviation 
from federal doctrine on several grounds. 
Some reject new judicial federalism as not grounded in legal doctrine or 
principles.79  Others reject new judicial federalism as a romantic longing for vibrant 
local communities, a notion harkening back to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries.80  These opponents urge that the states are not that different from each 
other, that we are one homogenous nation, and that we therefore require a national 
bill of rights.  The principle of national supremacy entails national uniformity in the 
interpretation of a right or set of rights, the opponents argue. 
Still other critics view new judicial federalism as result-oriented,81 designed to 
enlarge the protections afforded to criminal defendants and inimical to law 
enforcement and prosecutors.82 
                                                                
75Friesen, supra note 72, at 1069-70; Kahn, supra note 73, at 1155-56. 
76Friesen, supra note 72, at 1071; Kahn, supra note 73, at 1154-55.  
77Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 
71 (2001).  
78Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial 
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 97-99 (2000); DiGiovanni, supra note 21, at 1022; 
Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 82. 
79E.g., Gardner, supra note 23; Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the “New Judicial 
Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233 (1989); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side 
of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985).  
80See Kahn, supra note 73, at 1147. 
81E.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) (voicing concern “that state constitutional law is simply 
‘available’ to be manipulated to negate [U.S.] Supreme Court decisions which are deemed 
unsatisfactory”); George Deukmejian & Clifford Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor – 
Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 1009 (1979) 
(calling the California Supreme Court “result-oriented” in its interpretation of the state 
constitution). 
82E.g., Nina Morrison, Curing “Constitutional Amnesia”: Criminal Procedure Under 
State Constitutions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 880 (1998); James W. Diehm, New Federalism and 
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Another group of critics of new judicial federalism includes civil libertarians.  
These critics assert that new federalism is a means for the national government to 
retreat from its role of ensuring civil liberties.  They are concerned that it will be 
harder to persuade fifty state courts than one U.S. Supreme Court of the correctness 
of their position. 
Still others fear that state court judges, especially those who are elected, will be 
susceptible to local political influences and thus not able to decide the tough 
individual rights cases without a fear of the reaction of the majority.83  These critics 
are also concerned that citizens unhappy with judicial decisions will amend state 
constitutions to bolster the majority’s will.84  In many states, constitutional 
amendment is relatively easy to accomplish.85 
There are also those critics who oppose new judicial federalism as undermining 
the people’s trust and confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court’s moral 
authority.86 
Despite the debate, since the 1970s state courts have decided hundreds of cases 
that involve the interpretation of state bills of rights.87  New judicial federalism has 
given state courts an opportunity to shape their own role in the federal system and to 
adjust their relationship with the federal courts. 
The fundamental puzzle is to determine what the appropriate criteria are for 
deciding which questions in state and federal constitutional law should be deemed to 
be a matter of uniform national policy and which ones allow for state differences. 
These competing principles of national supremacy and state autonomy have 
played out differently in the state courts.  A state court may, for example, conclude 
that interpretation of its state constitution should follow the federal Constitution in a 
particular case or subject area because of its principled belief that national uniformity 
is a paramount consideration in that area.  Thus, some state courts might conclude 
that uniformity is needed in search and seizure law so that federal and state law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors may cooperate more easily, while 
simultaneously deciding to give other rights a uniquely local interpretation. 
In contrast, the majority of the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
generally adhere to federal precedent to interpret all parallel provisions of the 
Wisconsin Bill of Rights.  Wisconsin’s relationship to the federal system can, for the 
most part, be described as lock step. 
New judicial federalism is not an attempt to return to pre-Civil War nullification.  
The proponents of new judicial federalism do not suggest that state courts be the sole 
guardians of individual liberty or that the U.S. Supreme Court should cease defining 
the federal Bill of Rights.  Justice Brennan saw new judicial federalism as providing 
                                                          
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 223 (1996). 
83Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 80.  
84Id. at 80-81.  
85See Hammons, supra note 9, at 1333-34; Williams, supra note 36, at 215-16; Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (1999).  
86Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 77. 
87See 1 FRIESEN, supra note 22, at § 1-1(a).  
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a double source of protection for the rights of the people.88  The pull of federal 
constitutional doctrine is strong, and various interpretive doctrines give deference to 
the federal interpretation as state courts balance their interpretations of state law with 
their view of federalism and national supremacy.89 
III. 
And so we arrive in the present:  the year 2003 and this conference in particular.  
I have three observations I would like you to consider. 
The first is this:  Both the proponents and critics of new judicial federalism 
should be careful what they wish for. 
Debates about new judicial federalism have, to a large part, concentrated on 
decisions addressing the rights of criminal defendants90—partially because of Justice 
Brennan’s emphasis on civil liberties, partially because the protections for criminal 
defendants are analogous to those found in the U.S. Constitution, and partially 
because these cases raise controversial law and order issues.  Cases determining the 
scope of these controversial criminal justice issues, therefore, most clearly raise 
federalism issues.91  
The next frontier of new judicial federalism relating to individual rights, 
however, will involve different rights and different amendments.  I believe we are at 
the threshold of a debate on property rights.  New judicial federalism may raise the 
question whether states should give greater property rights and economic rights than 
those granted under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.92 
Will there be the same talk about local needs, national uniformity, political 
influence of state court judges, trust and confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
result-oriented decision-making when state courts have the opportunity to define a 
taking requiring compensation more broadly than the Supreme Court has?  Will 
proponents and opponents of new judicial federalism change their positions when 
property rights, rather than criminal defendant rights, gain more protection under 
state constitutions than under the federal Constitution? 
My second observation is this:  New judicial federalism’s initial focus on the 
rights of criminal defendants may have distorted the discussion of state constitutional 
law by putting undue emphasis on the practical needs for conformity with federal 
interpretation.93  But many state constitutional provisions protecting individual rights 
have no federal analogue.94  Some state constitutions, for example, guarantee 
                                                                
88Brennan, supra note 68, at 491.  
89See Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 75-78. 
90Id. at 80.  
91See Cornell W. Clayton, Toward a Theory of the Washington Constitution, 37 GONZ. L. 
REV. 41, 57 (2001-02). 
92Id. at 51. 
93See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 82; Diehm, supra note 82.  
94See Hammons, supra note 9, at 1332 (offering examples of state constitutional 
provisions that have no federal counterpart — an equal rights clause specifying protection for 
men and women, an express right to an interpreter for any non-English speaker who is charged 
with a crime, a clause giving laborers the right to collective action); 1 FRIESEN, supra note 22, 
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affirmative rights such as the right to education.95  The New York Constitution 
declares: “The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be 
provided by the state … in such manner … as the legislature may from time to time 
determine.”96  Federal law offers little assistance in resolving these issues. 
Moreover, issues relating to the constitutional structure of state government are 
particularly well-suited for state constitutional analysis, without any practical need 
for lock step analysis with the federal Constitution.  The U.S. Constitution has 
limited utility when a state court must interpret those provisions of a state 
constitution that address government powers and structure.97  For example, cases 
involving the power of the state legislature to tax, to incur debt, or to transfer powers 
from one agency to another.  Cases involving the governor’s veto power or power to 
contract.  Cases involving access to courts, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.  
These are all peculiarly state issues.  Doctrines of federal justiciability based on 
Article III of the federal Constitution may not be applicable to state judicial systems 
based on different constitutional provisions and different premises about 
governmental power.  Yet one commentator has pointed out, “very few states have 
considered how they may construct their own justiciability doctrines to meet the 
special needs of state and local governance.”98  Whatever one’s view of new judicial 
federalism with regard to individual rights, state courts must recognize where their 
constitutions are unique or relate to the structure of state government, and that they 
have the power and the need to decide these issues independently. 
My third observation is this:  The ability of state courts to debate new judicial 
federalism may be threatened. 
New judicial federalism faces a new threat from the view of federalism now 
espoused by the Rehnquist Court.  Many view the Rehnquist Court as creating an 
environment hostile to state court independent interpretation of state constitutional 
law.99 
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism has been referred to as “constitutional 
federalism.”100  More specifically, of course, constitutional federalism represents the 
approach of five Justices of the Rehnquist Court—Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.101  
                                                          
at § 6-2 (analyzing state clauses that guarantee a right to a civil remedy for injuries); id. § 2-
2(a) (reviewing state clauses that afford express protection for privacy rights). 
95Hershkoff, supra note 85, at 1186-90. 
96N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. 
97See Hammons, supra note 9, at 1329-30. 
98Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1841 (2001). 
99See, e.g., Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 70-73; Fugate, supra note 32, at 96-99. 
100Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 25 (2001). 
101Id. at 25; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, 
Sovereign Immunity, and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1283-84 (2000). 
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Constitutional federalism may be described as reviving judicially enforced 
constitutional limits on national power under the banner of federalism.102 
An underlying theme of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism is to preserve the states 
as independent and autonomous political entities.103  To many, the Rehnquist Court 
has become known as A State’s Best Friend.  Yet as scholars have pointed out, while 
the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional federalism has imposed new limits on Congress 
vis-a-vis the states, the Court has not really championed state autonomy.104  Indeed, 
Professor Joondeph, writing in the Ohio State Law Journal, says the Court has 
regularly disregarded important state sovereignty interests in federalism cases not 
involving limits on congressional authority.105  (I assume it is permissible to cite to 
the law review of another Ohio law school.) 
In short, the Rehnquist Court is not a steadfast champion of state sovereignty and 
autonomy. 
The Rehnquist Court’s concept of federalism entails two conflicting ideas about 
state authority.  On the one hand, the Rehnquist Court takes seriously the 
Constitution’s limits on Congress’s powers vis-a-vis the states, and has worked to 
protect the states from an overreaching federal government and thus to some extent 
enhanced the political autonomy of the states.106  On the other hand, the Rehnquist 
Court takes federal judicial supremacy seriously, imposing limitations on state court 
power in the interest of national uniformity and protecting national interests from 
state interference.107 
Most people familiar with the Rehnquist Court recognize the first of these two 
ideas—the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on devolution of power from Congress to the 
states.108 
                                                                
102See Calabresi, supra note 100, at 24 (“[t]he revival of federalism limits on national 
power by the U.S. Supreme Court”); Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional 
Error: The Rehnquist Court’s States’ Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of 
Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 261 (2001) (“resurrect[ing] the repudiated 
theory that state sovereignty and sovereign immunity act as affirmative limitations on federal 
powers”). 
103Simmons, supra note 102, at 268. 
104Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court’s Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conservatives, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 119 (2001) (“[D]espite their federalist rhetoric, the 
conservative justices have not hesitated to strike down state and local legislation and other 
action enhancing individual rights….”). 
105Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1781, 1784 (2001). 
106Calabresi, supra note 100, at 25; Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1784; John C. Yoo, In 
Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 783 (2001). 
107Schwartz, supra note 104, at 124-27, 129; Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1784. 
108See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional 
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997); 
Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (1996); Calabresi, supra note 100.  
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The Rehnquist Court has limited Congress’s power through interpretations of 
Commerce Clause powers, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.109 
The Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress’s 
commerce power.110  The Court held that the civil remedy of the Violence Against 
Women Act, permitting victims of gender-motivated violence to sue their attackers 
for damages, went beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.111  The breadth 
of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is now “ultimately a judicial rather than a 
legislative question.”112 
The Rehnquist Court held that a federal act directing states to regulate low-level 
radioactive waste according to federal directives or take title to waste generated in 
their borders exceeded Congress’s powers.113  Congress could not “commandeer” the 
legislative processes of the state by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.114  On similar grounds, the Court struck down the Brady 
Handgun requirement that local law enforcement officers do background checks on 
handgun purchasers.115  Thus, the Tenth Amendment allows the Court to impose 
limits on Congressional legislative authority.116 
Similarly, the Court has used the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from 
suit117— and, in a series of cases, the Rehnquist Court has adopted a restrictive view 
of Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.118 
Fewer people, however, are familiar with the second idea that makes up 
constitutional federalism—the expansion of the Supreme Court’s own power vis-a-
vis state courts. 
                                                                
109Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1804; Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 1283. 
110United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
111United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
112Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (subsequently quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614).  See 
Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1807. 
113New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
114Id. at 188. 
115Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
116Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1811-13. 
117See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
gives states immunity from suits in state court arising under federal law issued pursuant to 
Congress’s Article I powers); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the 
previously established congressional power to abrogate state immunity is limited to 
implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  For a stinging critique of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Chemerinsky, supra note 101, at 1286 
(“These decisions are the height of judicial hypocrisy.  The five most conservative Justices, 
who profess the need for judicial restraint in cases involving individual rights, disregard this 
completely in protecting state governments from suit.  No matter how much the Court 
pretends otherwise, the cases are nothing more than a value choice to favor state government 
power over individual rights.  This is a value choice that the Justices never justify and, I 
believe, cannot possibly justify.”). 
118See Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1813-20. 
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I offer two examples.  The first is the Rehnquist Court’s application of Michigan 
v. Long,119 a 1983 Burger Court decision, and the second is the Rehnquist Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore.120  Both cases are examples of the Rehnquist Court’s 
imposing limitations on state court power in order to preserve federal supremacy and 
promote national uniformity. 
State courts are the final arbiter of state law,121 an old and familiar doctrine.  
Furthermore, if a state judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds, the 
U.S. Supreme Court will not review either the state or the federal issues in the 
case,122 another old and familiar doctrine.  The adequate and independent state 
grounds doctrine is the generally accepted and traditional test for reconciling the 
respective claims of the state for independence of state law and of the national 
government for review of interpretations of federal law.123 
Before Michigan v. Long, if a state court opinion cited both the federal and state 
grounds for its decision on a constitutional issue, the U.S. Supreme Court would 
apply one of three approaches:  (1) it would dismiss the case; (2) it would remand the 
case to the state court to obtain clarification about the nature of the decision; or (3) it 
would examine state law to determine whether the state court had applied federal law 
to guide the application of state law or to provide the actual basis for the state court 
decision.124  These choices favored deference to the states. 
In 1983 the Burger Court decided Long, which replaced these three choices with 
a presumption in favor of U.S. Supreme Court review.125  Under Long, U.S. Supreme 
Court review can occur whenever (1) “a state court decision fairly appears to rest 
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law,” and (2) “the 
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the 
face of the opinion.”126  In such cases, the U.S. Supreme Court will assume “that the 
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law 
required it to do so.”127 
Importantly, however, the Long Court declared that if the state court indicates 
“clearly and expressly” by “a plain statement” that federal law is used for guidance 
and does not compel the result, federal review is not permitted.128 
                                                                
119463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
120531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
121Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 801 (1995) (citing Murdock v. Memphis, 87 
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) for the proposition that state courts are the final arbiters of state 
law). 
122ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.5.3, at 678 (3d ed. 1999). 
123See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-24, at 511 (3d ed. 
2000). 
124Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 69. 
125Id. at 69. 
126Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41; see Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 69. 
127Long, 463 U.S. at 1041; see Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 69. 
128Long, 463 U.S. at 1041; see Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 69-70. 
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Commentators are divided129 on whether the Long decision was designed to 
discourage state courts from exceeding federal courts in the protection of 
fundamental rights130 or was merely intended to hold state courts directly accountable 
for their decisions and prevent them from hiding behind the federal courts.131  
Either way, the result of the Long decision appeared to be that state courts could, 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by 
federal interference and still preserve the integrity of federal law.  State courts 
simply had to say expressly that that is what they were doing.132 
The Rehnquist Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its adherence to the Long 
doctrine, and its application of Long has led it to hold that a substantial number of 
state cases do not support the conclusion that they were decided on independent and 
adequate state grounds.133 
Dissenting U.S. Supreme Court justices have asserted, however, that the Court 
has extended Long beyond its original scope.134  Justice Marie Garibaldi of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court concludes that the Rehnquist Court cases suggest that the 
“justifications offered by the Court for preserving the adequate and independent state 
grounds doctrine, namely the reluctance to render advisory opinions and respect for 
state court decisions, are not being realized in the post-Long era.”135 
Nonreviewability of a state court decision is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgment of state autonomy.  Reviewability is the affirmation of national 
supremacy and the supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court.  By expanding the ability 
of the U.S. Supreme Court to review state decisions, the Rehnquist Court has 
undermined the development of state constitutional law. 
                                                                
129See Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 70 (surveying the range of critical responses to the 
Long decision). 
130Stewart G. Pollock, The Court and State Constitutional Law, in THE BURGER COURT: 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 244, 245 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998) (citing, as 
an example of this perspective, Ken Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, 1 
EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 29, 37 (1988) (suggesting that the Long decision was an 
attempt to expand U.S. Supreme Court review “over potentially unpalatable state 
constitutional decisions”)). 
131Pollock, supra note 130, at 245 (citing, as an example of this perspective, Michael 
Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25, 30 (1994)). 
132Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 70; Pollock, supra note 130, at 245-46. 
133Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 70-73. 
134See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 941 (1996) (holding that Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s opinion did not rest on an adequate and independent state law ground, but 
was instead “interwoven” with federal law); id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that 
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that the majority’s decision has “extend[ed] Michigan v. Long beyond its original scope”); id. 
at 950 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the state-law ground supporting these judgments is 
so much clearer than has been true on most prior occasions, these decisions exacerbate [the 
unfortunate] effects [of the Long decision] to a nearly intolerable degree.”). 
135Garibaldi, supra note 24, at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting 
W. Craig Williams, Constitutional Law: Premature Federal Adjudication Through the Plain 
Statement Rule, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 135 (1996)). 
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I now turn to Bush v. Gore.136  The Rehnquist Court, as you will remember, 
resolved a presidential election dispute. 
Some view the decision as hypocritical because the Rehnquist Court is known as 
the state’s best friend, and the Court’s order ending the election contest “was based 
on its own interpretation of Florida election law, apparently encroaching on the 
Florida Supreme Court’s authority to determine the meaning of Florida statutes.”137 
Others view the decision, especially the concurrence, as consistent with the core 
aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional federalism.138  The concurrence 
argued that Florida’s judiciary “had so re-written the state’s electoral laws that it had 
violated Article II’s delegation of authority to the state legislatures to choose the 
method for selecting presidential electors.”139 As one commentator concludes, the 
concurrence viewed Article II as granting plenary power to state legislatures and 
thereby mandating federal oversight of a state court’s interpretation of state law.140  
“Under this theory, the federal courts not only review whether state law, as 
interpreted by state courts, violates the federal Constitution, but also review whether 
the state court correctly interpreted state law.”141 
The concurrence justified this extraordinary assertion of federal authority “based 
on the need to protect the state legislature from the state courts.”142  Thus, the 
concurrence saw uniformity in construction of state election procedures as desirable 
and a justification for federalizing the interpretation of state law.143  According to this 
same commentator, the concurrence has a flawed understanding of state constitutions 
and the role of state constitutions in the state law process.144  The flaw is viewing 
state constitutions as homogenous and distrusting state judges.145  This combination 
of attitudes does not bode well for new judicial federalism. 
Thus, in Bush v. Gore, as it has done in its application of Michigan v. Long, the 
Rehnquist Court appears to have limited state court power to interpret state law in 
order to preserve the interests of the nation.146  In deciding Bush v. Gore, the Court 
arguably acted in keeping with the general trends of its own jurisprudence over the 
last decade.147  And in both of these decisions, the Rehnquist Court has increased its 
powers vis-a-vis Congress and the state courts. 
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137Joondeph, supra note 105, at 1783. 
138Yoo, supra note 106, at 790. 
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140Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in 
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IV. 
A former deputy solicitor general of the United States said federalism is presently 
a mess.148  I see federalism as an evolving process.  In the history of our federal 
system, decentralization predominates in certain decades, while centralization 
predominates in others.  We are in an era of both centralization and decentralization.  
State courts have been reasserting themselves and giving attention to their state 
constitutions.  At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court is creating a role for itself 
that may be viewed as increasingly hostile to independent state constitutional 
interpretation. 
It is in this milieu that state courts must now interpret their own constitutions, and 
tomorrow we turn to Ohio’s approach to state constitutional law. 
I close by paraphrasing Garrison Keillor’s message from Lake Wobegon.149  
Tomorrow we’ll hear all the news from Ohio, where all the women justices on the 
Ohio Supreme Court are strong, all the men justices are good looking, and all the 
Ohio Supreme Court decisions are above average. 
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149GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1985). 
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